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Abstract 
Different techniques and tools have been introduced for the analysis of process systems that each has their own capabilities and 
limitations namely HAZOP and ETBA. One of the process systems which require to be analyzed by these techniques is the chlorination 
unit of the treatment plants. Due to frequent use of chlorine, an intrinsically hazardous gas, this unit is among the most critical units of a 
treatment plant. In this study, the safety- related features of the chlorination unit in Tehran treatment plant was investigated employing 
two methodologies: HAZOP and ETBA and the results from the two techniques were compared.  The decision criteria to choose the best 
methodology was based on six factors (number of identified risks, the cost of eliminating intolerable risks, the number of identified 
human errors, the identified risk levels, the time and budget required to perform the assessment). Considering the fact that HAZOP and 
ETBA, each seem to be preferable in accordance with some of these factors, it was difficult to decide on the proffered methodology. In 
order to determine the best methodology, the AHT (Analytical Hierarchy process) was used. Results from this technique indicated that 
ETBA is more preferable to serve the purposes of the present study. 
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1. Introduction  
With the ever increasing pace of development and introduction of new materials and technologies, almost at any moment, 
novel problems appear in the workplaces.  Certainly, dealing with them and controlling unacceptable risks requires being 
knowledgeable about the approaches, methods and recent techniques in the field of safety science. 
The main purpose of this study was to evaluate the level of safety in a chlorination unit using two mentioned techniques 
(HAZOP and ETBA) and making a comparison between them. In terms of safety, chlorination unit in water treatment plant 
is one of the most critical units in a way that its failure can lead to devastating consequences. 
Chlorine is readily-absorbed, irritating and suffocating gas with the threshold limit value (TLV) of the 3 milligrams per 
cubic meter for the inhaled air. Breathing small quantities of chlorine may cause severe poisoning which might be fatal as 
well. 
According to the previous studies if on average in every 5.5 years 1000 deaths occurs from 100 incidents in the nuclear 
power plants, is equal to the number of deaths due to chlorine gas release during 5.3 years. 
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Several Chlorine gas leakages have occurred in Iran over the previous decades. Just in one occasion the chlorine gas 
leakage from a gas cylinder in Astara inflicted injury to several people. In another incident in December 2001, the chlorine 
gas leakage in a water treatment station in Tehran led to 2 deaths and 50 injured persons.  
The research conducted by Nezamodin in 2006 using FTA method to assess the risk of chlorine gas leakage in the 
chlorination system, identified the combination of causes and contributing factors in the leakage of chlorine gas in Tehran 
chlorination stations [2]. 
A study by Horton et al during 1993- 2000 which was carried out  in 16 states in America , showed that although the 
number of chlorine gas release accidents over the years have been reduced , the release of this gas compared to other 
chemical accidents, has affected many more victims. The results from this study highlighted the equipment failure and 
human error as the most common factors in causing such events [3].  
Assessment of the risk of ignition and explosion in an oil storage company by HAZOP methodology, determined human 
error and operational deviations, prioritized by a risk matrix, as major risk of the system [4]. 
Arghami (2007) conducted a study to identify the risks in corn processing industry using Energy Trace and Barrier 
Analysis (ETBA) methodology and Equipment, work processes and Different energy resources within the system were 
recognized then the vulnerable targets of the release of various energy sources and existing safeguards were studied [5]. 
2. Materials and methods 
This descriptive – analytical study was carried out in Tehran's water treatment plant chlorination unit.  Observation, 
checklist, interviews with key persons and the documentation were used to identify the system, behavior and risk areas. 
Risk assessment and identification method including Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA) and hazard and 
operability study (HAZOP) was used to identify and assess risks. To prioritize and select optimal technique Analytical 
Hierarchy process (AHP) was employed.  
The first step to recognize process and equipment in HAZOP methodology is dividing system into operating nodes such 
as cylinders, flexible pipes, and collector line. The next step is to identify deviations using keywords which are divided into
two subsets. 
A) Primary Keywords: The words refer to a particular aspect of the design goal or process and conditions parameters 
such as pressure, temperature and flow. 
B) Secondary keywords: These words in combination with Primary Keywords indicate system deviations. They can be 
such items as more than, as well as, part of, etc. 
Through the next steps, after estimating deviation results, diversion causes were determined .The deviations risk 
determination, existing controls and their effectiveness, recommended controls and implementation costs would be the next 
steps in HAZOP study. 
In the ETBA, the first step was to identify the energy forms within the system employing an energy check list. Detected 
energies were investigated from the time they log in to the system (Login or from the place of origin), until they exist in the
system or transformed or converted to other forms of energy. 
The second step was determination of barriers (guards) in the energy pathways. Barriers act as proactive factors for 
controlling the likelihood and severity of damage to a target. In the next step determination of vulnerable targets including 
personnel / product / environment / equipment / efficiency / reputation of an individual or legal entity / etc, the level of risk 
of energies were evaluated to assess effectiveness of controls. Finally, by offering the appropriate controls (corrective 
actions) and determining the costs of implementation, secondary risk level was determined. 
For prioritizing and selecting the optimum method AHP technique was used. This is the most efficient technique based 
on paired comparisons and provides a review of various scenarios. The modeling in this method involves the following 
steps:
(1) Creating a hierarchical structure for the problem /  
(2) Determining the paired comparison matrices and calculating the weight of criteria and options /  
(3) Investigating the system adaptation. 
3. Results
In the evaluation performed by HAZOP, 6 nodes were examined and 151 risks were recognized; 16 intolerable risk levels, 
33 moderate risk levels and 102 low risk levels. Among the identified risks; volume, pressure and temperature increase of 
the liquid chlorine in the cylinder, room temperature increase, chlorine reaction with sprinkler’s water, lines over-pressure, 
lack of water flow from sprinkler and the incorrect data associated with leaking , had the highest risk levels. 
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In the evaluation conducted by ETBA, 9 nodes were examined and 8 energy forms and 59 risks were identified. In total, 
20 risks with intolerable levels of risk, 14 with moderate risk levels and 25 with low risk levels were recognized. In all 
nodes examined, “the reaction and involvement of individuals” allocated the highest risk levels. 
According to the evaluations conducted, 5% of the errors identified by the ETBA and only 0.6% of the errors by the 
HAZOP were attributed to human errors. Considering the costs associated with control of intolerable risks, the proposed 
control methods had average cost in HAZOP and low cost in ETBA, so in general, the cost of taking control measures in 
HAZOP is more than ETBA. Having performed an economic analysis, the time and cost required to perform the assessment 
by HAZOP is 3 times more than ETBA. 
Findings from the evaluation conducted by the AHP to determine the preferred methodology based on the above criteria 
is shown in Tables 1, 2, 3. As you can see ETBA with a final score higher than the HAZOP is preferred in this study and 
given the inconsistency (incompatibility) rate of less than 0.1, the obtained incompatibility is acceptable. 
Table 1. Hazop Worksheet 
No Deviation Cause Consequence 
Existing
Controls 
Risk 1 Recommendations Risk2 
Control 
costs
1.1 
Increasing of Chlorine 
In cylinder 
Increasing of 
Temperature 
Cylinder 
Blasting
Manometer 2×5×3=30
Periodic 
Maintenance 
1×5×3=15 Moderate 
Table 2. ETBA Worksheet 
Table 3. I.R.R based on Criteria No. 
10987654321n
1.451.451.411.321.241.120.90.5800I.I.R
4. Discussion 
In terms of identified risks frequency, the results of current study employing HAZOP and ETBA techniques showed that 
in general, 151 and 59 risks were recognized by HAZOP and ETBA respectively. Therefore, the number of identified risks 
by the HAZOP, despite having fewer nodes, is more than 2.5 times the number of identified risks by ETBA. 
According to study conducted by Habibi et al., (2011) the number of risks identified by HAZOP had been more than 
ETBA [6]. 
Reviewing the identified risk levels by two methods, results demonstrated that the percentage of high risk levels 
(intolerable) identified by the ETBA is more than HAZOP; for instance HAZOP identified 17% and ETBA 20% of nodes as 
intolerable risks. So it seems that ETBA in comparison with HAZOP is more capable of identifying the high risk levels. 
In the studied unit, ETBA and HAZOP have each introduced 5 and 3 nodes respectively, in which there are moderate risk 
levels. For this reason, the percentage of moderate risk levels identified by ETBA is more than HAZOP. As the highest risk 
levels are allocated to human errors, and with regard to the fact that ETBA mainly focuses on human errors more than 
HAZOP, the identified risk levels by the ETBA are higher than HAZOP. 
Nezamodini in her research expressed that the highest risk levels is related to human errors and hardware failure [7]. 
Since the percentages of low-risk levels identified by the HAZOP were more than ETBA, it appears that HAZOP is more 
capable in lower risk levels identification.  
In terms of controlling cost, in the current research, the highest percentage of recommended controls are associated with 
average cost and low cost for HAZOP and ETBA respectively. Therefore, in general, controlling costs in HAZOP seems to 
Control 
costs
Risk2 Recommendations 
Controls 
Efficiency 
Risk 1 target 
Existing
Controls 
Energy 
Type 
Energy 
Code 
No
Moderate 1×5×3=15
Cooler with thermostat 
installation
Personnel required to use 
personal protective equipment   
Low 2×5×3=30
Personnel, 
Equipment 
None
Pressured
Liquid 
4.1 1.1 
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be more than ETBA. At each node, the percentage of control that can lead to high costs is lower than the percentage of low 
and medium cost controls. 
Investigating the identified human errors by two methods indicated that, 0.6 % of human errors by HAZOP and 5% by 
ETBA have been recognized. Thus it can be concluded that the process HAZOP has more ability to identify human errors. 
Schurman et al in their paper entitled Human Factors in HAZOP stated that HAZOP ignores risks created by human act 
because more than 90% of the potential or existing risks might be ignored [8]. Cagno et al in their research entitled multi-
level HAZOP introduced ignoring human errors as one of the disadvantages of HAZOP methodology [9]. 
In terms of time and budget required to perform the assessment by HAZOP and ETBA, considering 50,000 Rials as the 
cost of hourly wages of an expert, time and money spent for HAZOP is "3" times more than ETBA. This finding is in 
agreement with Labovsky et al in a paper named implementing HAZOP in fixed-bed reactor which showed HAZOP is so 
time-consuming and this is one of the biggest disadvantages [10]. 
Labovsky et al have presented a mathematical model for HAZOP implementation on the use of HAZOP in safety 
analysis and risk recognition. They have also expressed reducing the time required to perform HAZOP as one of the main 
purpose of this model [11]. Habibi et al., (2011) in his research has also mentioned HAZOP as a method that requires more 
time and cost [6]. Employing AHP technique for selecting the final methodology, with regard to the following final scores it 
offers that ETBA more preferable than HAZOP. 
5. Conclusion 
The prominent suggestions were the modification and improvement of process and equipment which play an important 
role in the reduction of hazards. In conclusion, the identification of hazards by HAZOP and ETBA indicates that they could, 
systemically, assess and criticize the process of consumption or production. These techniques can be, therefore, considered 
as an effective method for recognition and prediction of hazards and it may increase the safety levels, prevent accidents and 
enhance the reliability of systems via the reduction of operational problems. 
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